University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

UTC Scholar
Honors Theses

Student Research, Creative Works, and
Publications

5-2019

The Vietnam War at home and abroad: soldiers, military
leadership, and the antiwar movement
Mason E. Fox
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, maseyfox@comcast.net

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.utc.edu/honors-theses
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Fox, Mason E., "The Vietnam War at home and abroad: soldiers, military leadership, and the antiwar
movement" (2019). Honors Theses.

This Theses is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research, Creative Works, and Publications
at UTC Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UTC Scholar.
For more information, please contact scholar@utc.edu.

Fox 1

The Vietnam War at Home and Abroad: Soldiers, Military Leadership,
and the Antiwar Movement
Mason E. Fox

Departmental Honors Thesis
The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
History Department

Examination Date: March 22, 2019

Susan Eckelmann Berghel
Professor of History
Thesis Director

William Kuby
Assistant Professor of History
Department Examiner

Anne Tracy Samuel
Associate Professor of History
Department Examiner

Fox 2
Introduction

The Vietnam era represents one of the most turbulent periods in American history; on the
home front, the civil rights movement, antiwar protests, and political tensions shaped American
politics and raised critical questions about the rationale that informed foreign policies and
motivated military engagements in Southeast Asia. Growing domestic tensions shaped the
decisions of American political leaders and military officials.

Today, popular memory of the 1960s and 1970s revolves around college students
passionately engaging in antiwar and civil rights movements, and major political episodes like
the Kennedy assassination, Johnson’s signing of the Civil Rights Act, and the Watergate
Scandal. Yet, soldiers’ experiences in Vietnam and their responses to the rising tensions at home
are often times overlooked. Most high school and college textbooks focus on the Vietnam War’s
political strife, the brutal fighting conditions, and the unrest at home. Americans internalize the
war’s history through popular conceptions including secondary textbooks’ narrow perspectives
that fall short in presenting soldiers’ myriad views. As time pushes popular memory further from
the conflict, the media has played a more significant role in defining the war—the war’s
objectives, the underlying political disagreements between public and military leaders, the
strategic decisions, and public perception. Popular recollections discount the voices of the
soldiers who were stationed abroad. This thesis seeks to enrich our understanding of the Vietnam
War era by highlighting soldiers’ war experiences and responses. Soldiers often pleaded for
American trust in the military and expressed their own philosophical views about the meaning of
war. For example, Captain James Polk Spruill articulated the similarities in aiding the South
Vietnamese and our own fights for freedom in the American Revolution. He wrote, “It was
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brought to my attention last night that we were once inadequately equipped and poorly trained
[in the American Revolution], and that professional soldiers came from afar to aid the fledgling
American Army in its fight for freedom and internal order… It is heartwarming to think that we
now continue the tradition of sacrifice when they aided a nation in need.”1 Many soldiers
committed themselves to the American tradition of fighting for freedom, while other soldiers
began to feel true freedom rested on the independence of the Vietnamese to decide on their
proper course.

The myriad perspectives of Vietnam veterans highlight the intricate nature of the
Vietnam War. Part of the difficulty in analyzing the Vietnam War is the complexity of prevailing
notions about the war itself. Some scholars have questioned the role of the media, politics, and
public preparedness in the failures of Vietnam. Others have interrogated military strategies and
ideology. Others still, have gone further to analyze the moral underpinning and motivations of
warfare in general. This thesis will digest many of those past perceptions and create a richer
analysis of soldiers’ morale, and its effect on the war effort. The Vietnam conflict became a
complex cycle of political and military endeavors while simultaneously striving to please an
increasingly impatient public. As political promises faltered, and military action became more
onerous, anti-war protests intensified. At times, Americans cast blanket-sweep expectations of
the Vietnam War by comparing it to World War II. Thus, general unpreparedness for the realities
of war caused bitter disappointments and frustrations within the public and military. Moreover,
this era introduced the television into warfare, and therefore, illuminated the necessity for public

Captain James Polk Spruill, Letter to Wife, “The Line is Drawn: Extracts from Letters written
by Captain Spruill,” Vietnam, 1963-1964, 3.
https://vva.vietnam.ttu.edu/repositories/2/digital_objects/580591.
1
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responsibility acquiring information. Even today, the general public at times consumes
information, blindly accepting its convictions. This problem especially intensified during the
Vietnam War, placed in perspective the justification of waging limited, restrictive wars. In short,
U.S. leaders began debating the advantages or disadvantages of total versus limited war. Limited
war, for example, can be described as the avoidance of unrestrained warfare by focusing on
political goals through limited military measures.2 Meanwhile absolute warfare would involve
the enemy’s unconditional surrender with the mobilization of an entire nation.3 Both of these
styles of warfare became heavily debated during the Vietnam War. Thus, this thesis will address
the complexities of the Vietnam War by analyzing, specifically, the impacts it had on soldiers in
Vietnam.
For example, this thesis will analyze why such contrasting opinions of pro- and anti-war
arose in the military. Factors such as the public responses, media coverage, political restrictions
and military decisions will be simultaneously addressed so as to develop a deeper understanding
of the complexities of the Vietnam War efforts. Thus, this research will examine the
circumstances that contributed to a decline in the morale among soldiers during the Vietnam War
and the years following military engagement in Southeast Asia.
Divided into four sections outlining the changes in soldiers’ responses, this thesis focuses
on the responses from the military, media, broader public, and politicians. To narrow the scope,
this thesis will concentrate on one military campaign, the Battle of Hamburger Hill in 1969.
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Muhammad Zarrar Haider, Misconception of Limited War, (San Francisco: Academia, 2019).
https://www.academia.edu/6948557/Misconception_of_Limited_War.
3
Brian W. Brennan, Limited vs. Total War, (Fort Benning: Armor Officer Basic Course, 2002).
https://www.ysmithcpallen.com/sites/default/files/sites/all/documents/Limited%20Vs%20Total%
20War.pdf.
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Hamburger Hill is significant to our understanding of the Vietnam War in part because of
similarities to the public reception of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Both campaigns were American
victories, yet, the American public perceived the conflicts as irresponsible losses. Hamburger
Hill, therefore, is an important focus in this thesis because it illuminates differences and
disagreements between the military, public, media, and politicians. Likewise, it was famously
abandoned after the victory—and much like the Tet Offensive, resulted in the ultimate drop in
morale of the U.S. military. The first section provides an overview of the military decisions and
procedures during Hamburger Hill, and documents the events leading up to and immediately
following the altercation. The second section analyzes journalists’ coverage of the battle and how
this reporting shaped public responses, politicians’ policies, and military decisions. Since the
Vietnam War is considered the first televised war, a discussion of the role of the media will shed
light on these issues, and the ultimate futility of the conflict. The third section examines
veterans’ responses to the war, including one particular fraction among soldiers who expressed
their disappointment with inadequate public support and frustrations with media coverage that
undermined their wartime efforts. Furthermore, this section will also illuminate the factors that
caused consistent frustrations among GIs who joined the anti-war movement while others
requested more support. The final section explores the effects of wartime media coverage on
military leadership during the war, and top officers’ growing frustrations in response to
politicians’ logistical restrictions. For example, U.S. forces were restricted from invading
Cambodia or Laos to follow the enemy; military officials lacked authority to pursue military
strategies; and troops were only permitted to fight when threatened by the enemy. This thesis
seeks to understand the complexities of the Vietnam War and the factors that influenced soldiers’
morale abroad and upon return to the United States.
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Scholarship such as James Westheider’s book, Fighting in Vietnam: The Experiences of
the U.S. Soldier, and Jonathan Caverly’s article, The Myth of the Military Myopia: Democracy,
Small Wars, and Vietnam address key perspectives of the Vietnam War. Westheider argues that
soldiers in Vietnam dealt with an immense number of outside factors during the war. While most
focused on simply surviving by the time they arrived in Vietnam, many soldiers frequently faced
the frustrations of media, restrictions, and public dissent. Westheider sectioned his book into
soldiers’ responses to a vast number of influences like journalistic coverage, public support,
political restrictions, training, returning home, and many more. His examination of the common
soldiers’ different experiences creates a dynamic and detailed observation of their struggles.
Furthermore, Jonathan Caverly’s article presents a fascinating perspective of the problems
waging a limited war within a democratic country. Caverly argues that, although democratic
nations such as the United States are superior in modes of living, attempts to enter a small war in
foreign lands is almost impossible due to the powerful role of the public in response to war
efforts in Vietnam. His observation, therefore, revealed the futilities of the Vietnam War, and he
acknowledges the influence of diminished public support. David Flores’ article, Memories of
War: Sources of Vietnam Veterans Pro- and Antiwar Political Attitudes compares the differences
in pro- and anti-war attitudes, and how family upbringing impacted soldiers’ opinions. Flores
paid specific attention to the impact of U.S. success in World War II, and how children growing
up with war heroes and parades expected similar experiences entering Vietnam. Thus, this work
sheds light on the morale of soldiers and the many factors influencing their beliefs towards the
war.
Examining sources ranging from newspaper clippings, interviews, and letters, this thesis
will address the complex nature of the Vietnam War, and its impact on soldiers at the time, and
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even today. Letters will reveal the attitudes of soldiers towards the war including frustrations,
homesickness, and hope. In addition, interviews help paint a more complete picture of the event
as many veterans have been able to think about their experiences in more context. Newspaper
clippings will reveal a multitude of viewpoints including firsthand accounts, antiwar sentiments,
and prowar attitudes. One of the most complicated and controversial events of the Vietnam
conflict, occurred with the Battle of Hamburger Hill in 1969.
Section 1: A Battle Won but also Lost

The United States entered the Vietnam War differently than in its past conflicts. The
Revolutionary War, for example, was sparked by the Battle of Lexington and Concord in 1775—
creating an exact moment for the start of a war. The Civil War began with Fort Sumter in 1861
and U.S. entrance into World War II was spurred by the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 leading
to a subsequent declaration of war. The Vietnam War, in contrast, had no fixed beginning. The
United States, instead, eased into warfare between 1950 and 1965 due to the constant effort to
balance world peace and defeat Communism. U.S. entrance into Vietnam occurred after the
transition from French military occupation to active U.S. involvement with goals of effective
counterinsurgency.
After the end of WWII in 1945, immediate tensions mounted between the two world
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Much of the disputes can be traced to the
differing strategies of how to handle postwar European economic recovery and governance. The
Soviet Union called for economic disabling of the Allies’ enemies and taking control of those
territories. The United States, however, asserted that a plan meant to aid the countries like
Germany, Poland, and Italy would prevent further hostilities as these countries improved
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economically. Thus, the Marshall Plan, an example of American postwar policy, was enacted to
financially aid the countries struggling in the post-war climate. Both the Soviet Union and the
United States accused each other of seeking global domination, and not long after political
disagreements and threats of nuclear warfare surfaced. According to Michael Dockrill, a
historian of the Cold War, “the possession of nuclear weapons of ever increasing and formidable
power, and the appalling consequences of their use, did impose some restraint on the leaders of
each side in their dealings with the other but, during the many confrontations between the two
sides after 1946, the slightest miscalculation or overreaction might well have led to
catastrophe.”4 This divided American politics and inspired fear among Americans. The United
States appeared to be in a constant state of paranoia and sought to stop the threat of communism.
Unlike communist nations, the United States embraced individual autonomy, humanitarian
principles, and limited government control. If communism continued to spread, U.S. officials
feared the free market would suffer, national security would be at risk, and countless innocent
civilians would lose their rights of humanity and freedom. U.S. fears were confirmed with the
growing popularity of communism in Vietnam.
On September 2, 1945 the Vietminh group, led by Ho Chi Minh, declared independence
from French rule. The French government responded by declaring martial law and began moving
troops to Vietnam to contain rebellion. French and Vietminh forces continued to battle over
control well into the 1950s. In May 1950, President Harry S. Truman authorized moderate
military and economic aid to France.5 Even with U.S. assistance, the Vietminh defeated French
forces at Dienbienphu in 1954. As a result, the Geneva Conference decided upon a Communist
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Michael Dockrill, The Cold War: 1945-1963, (London: MacMillan, 1988), 34.
Andrew J. Potter, “The Causes of the Vietnam War” (Urbana-Champaign: University of
Illinois, 1999).
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state of North Vietnam and a “free” state in South Vietnam—each separated by a boundary at the
17th parallel. The Geneva Accords further stated, “so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the
settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of
independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the
fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions…”6 The Geneva Conference
allowed Vietnamese people to decide upon their political interests relying on a democratic
system. This decision, however, dissatisfied U.S. officials as they feared Ho Chi Minh would
win the elections and spread communism into South Vietnam.
The perceived threat of communism informed President Dwight Eisenhower’s attempts to
install a democratic government in South Vietnam with the Diem regime, while also training the
South Vietnamese army in 1954. American support of the Diem government proved
unsuccessful when it refused to adopt democratic principles. By “winning the hearts and minds”
of the Vietnamese people, American politicians believed they could turn the war. This meant that
military, political, and economic attempts would be made to pacify the people under the
influence of the Viet Cong. Cold War tensions became especially pronounced in 1961 when
President John F. Kennedy introduced counterinsurgency to simultaneously defeat and contain
communist insurgency.7 Although initial attempts to use counterinsurgency involved aiding
security, political, and economic issues, John F. Kennedy’s strategy ultimately became more of a
military approach with the use of Special Forces.8 Following Kennedy’s assassination in 1963,

6

Geneva Convention, Indochina—Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem
of Restoring Peace in Indo-China, July 21, 1954, as transcribed by Yale Law School, 2008.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/inch005.asp.
7
Potter, “The Causes of the Vietnam War.”
8
Rufus Phillips, “Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Lessons for Today,” American Foreign
Service Association, Last date modified 2018. http://www.afsa.org/counterinsurgency-vietnamlessons-today.
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President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration inherited wartime challenges. The closest to a war
declaration of the Vietnam War occurred in 1964 when two U.S. warships were attacked by the
North Vietnamese in the South China Sea. Thus, Johnson responded to the conflict with the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution which stated, “that the Congress approves and supports the determination
of the President to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the
United States and to prevent further aggression.”9 Although this resolution enabled Johnson to
respond with force when necessary, it maintained an overly loose commitment to Vietnam. This
broad definition of the U.S. role in Vietnam ultimately led to more frustrations and
disappointment from the American public, media, and soldiers. Even with Johnson’s defensive
measure, growing communist momentum in Vietnam resulted in his decision to enlarge
American participation only a month after the resolution. Johnson attempted to avoid an all-out
war by using aerial attacks and sustained bombing instead of a full invasion. Johnson pursued a
limited war since a full declaration might have upset the American public, and worse yet, China
or Russia could potentially jump to aid North Vietnam and start another world war. A full
escalation certainly would bring severe consequences. Johnson’s other option was to simply
refrain from involvement entirely. This strategy, however, as Johnson’s predecessors and Cold
War believers claimed, would solidify the global spread of communism. Moreover, if the United
States had chosen to abandon the South Vietnamese, this would have severely contradicted the
reputation of the United States as guardians of human liberties and rights. These considerations
explain the Johnson administration’s decision to pursue a limited war that would attempt to
simultaneously satisfy the American public, contain communist aggression, defeat insurgency,

9

Tonkin Gulf Resolution; Public Law 88-408, 88th Congress, August 7, 1964; General Records
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and promote American ideologies—high expectations for a desultory strategy. Joint Chief of
Staff member, General Maxwell Taylor, immediately voiced his hesitations with a limited war
and claimed “in order to defeat insurgency in South Vietnam the U.S. must be prepared to put
aside many of the self-imposed restrictions which now limit our efforts, and to undertake bolder
actions which may embody greater risks.”10 Taylor’s remarks were directed towards the overly
broad Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, attempts to militarize South Vietnam, and U.S. covert
missions. In 1965, Johnson agreed that more commitment was necessary, but even so, he and his
advisers came up with a limited policy. This policy concluded that “for any Viet Cong attack on
a major American base (or South Vietnam), a reprisal will be undertaken within 24 hours against
one or more selected targets in the North, and forces would be used to maximum extent.”11 This
responsive strategy forced the U.S. military to wait for the enemy to make their first move before
American forces could attack. Consequently, marines in Vietnam were frequently waiting for a
moment to retaliate, further restricting them from gaining momentum by employing attacks. In
effect, the U.S. military was not utilizing the effectiveness of preemptive strikes or “first strike
advantage.”12 A preemptive strike would involve attacking the enemy first so as to surprise,
overwhelm, and prevent the Vietcong from attacking. American military officials frequently
requested preemptive attacks, but Johnson instead employed Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965
which would utilize sustained American bombing and increased troops to protect airfields.13
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General Maxwell Taylor as translated by Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A
History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.
Inc., 1973), 462.
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Colin Gray, The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A
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Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower or the Limits of Strategy: The Air Wars in Vietnam
and their Legacies, (Washington D.C.: National War College, 2015), 111.
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Mark Clodfelter, a professor at the National War College explains, “accordingly, they [political
and military officials] designed an air strategy that gradually increased pressure on the North,
allowing President Johnson to gauge reactions from the Chinese, Soviets, American public, and
other global audiences while he slowly opened the bombing spigot.”14 Essentially, Johnson was
choosing a gradual entrance into war, but this strategy was ignoring the effectiveness of quick
strikes which employed elements of both surprise and overwhelming the enemy. Johnson eased
into a war, and many military officials voiced their frustrations with this method since it was not
utilizing the strength of American forces. According to Clodfelter, the US strategy of gradual
escalation was seriously flawed: “For most of his [Johnson’s] time in office, the Viet Cong and
their North Vietnamese allies rarely fought at all. Together, they fought an average of one day a
month from 1965 to 1968, and as a result, their external supply requirements were minimal… No
amount of bombing could stop that paltry supply total from arriving in the South.”15 In effect, the
Viet Cong’s inconsistent attacks created problems for the American forces since their strategy
called for retaliating only when the enemy struck first. This meant that US forces frequently
waited for the Viet Cong to attack, and according to Clodfelter, those attacks rarely occurred
anyway. Aerial strikes, therefore, were ineffective against the small, mobile forces of the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Military officials at the time persisted that if US forces attacked
quickly and with complete power, the smaller Viet Cong army would be unable to absorb the
blow. Finally, General Taylor convinced the administration to allow U.S. Marines to pursue the
enemy after being attacked—but this also came with a restriction. U.S. forces were only
permitted to follow the enemy 50 miles from their base. This further limited military success,

14
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Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower of the Limits of Strategy, 113.
Ibid, 113.
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and, especially consequential, morale and momentum certainly suffered as a result. In all,
sustained bombing of a decentralized economy, and efforts to militarize South Vietnam failed,
but if Johnson escalated too sharply, he risked sparking another world war. Indeed, politicians
and military officials were forced into a no-win situation, and as Johnson continued to gradually
increase troop involvement, the home front continuously grew more frustrated with broken
promises of a short war.
By 1969, the war in Vietnam had reached a boiling point in the eyes of the American
public and within political circles. Johnson’s promises of a short war did not materialize, and his
frequent claims of US success fell short. Viet Cong’s surprise attack in 1968, substantiated home
front suspicions of Johnson’s empty promises. Though it was a US victory, the 1968 Tet
Offensive sparked a massive public outrage against the war. Due to growing public dissent, the
US looked to gradually withdraw troops from Vietnam after 1968. Politicians, including Lyndon
Johnson and later Richard Nixon, in an effort to please the military and the public, found
themselves in a no-win corner. In other words, politicians attempted to fight for the protection of
human freedom in Vietnam, so they mobilized the military, yet as US forces requested more
commitment, the home front became dissatisfied with broken promises of a short war. As a
result, politicians felt cornered as they tried to end a war for public appeasement, but also pursue
victory as a military objective. Escalation would mean public outrage, and potential violent
military reactions from China or Soviet Union. Meanwhile, drawing back would result in
American embarrassment, failed objectives to aid South Vietnam, and a win for communism.
American policy makers were forced to choose the latter. As US involvement gradually lost
momentum, the military, more than ever, experienced a tightened leash by politicians. Search
and destroy missions became the main strategy for US troops. It entailed exploring the area to
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locate the enemy and withdraw as soon as the enemy has been destroyed. This tactic was
introduced after US forces realized taking ground using full invasions against the guerrilla Viet
Cong was impractical for protecting American lives and capturing a fleeting enemy. This tactic
led to the 187th Infantry’s attack on Dong Ap Bia Mountain—later to be coined Hamburger Hill.

In early May of 1969, a joint operation of soldiers combining South Vietnamese ARVN
troops along with US Army soldiers from the 3rd Brigade, 101st Division were combing through
the heavy forests of south-central Vietnam, a territory dotted with steep ravines, thick forest, and
very few signs of civilization for miles in any direction. The US mission was to comb through
the territory in search of any enemy activity. The troops had been busy establishing fire bases in
and around the Dong Ap Bia Mountain territory when the enemy was sighted on an insignificant
ridge numbered “937” by US Army maps. Small arms fire erupted all over Hill 937 on May 10
and Lt Col Weldon Honeycutt responded with artillery fire directly onto the hill. The 187th
Airborne moved around the mountain searching for the enemy as artillery fire bombarded the hill
until May 14th. By this time, the enemy had been recognized as the 29th North Vietnamese
regiment, and under supporting artillery fire, three companies of the 187th began deliberate
maneuvers up the mountain.16 Meanwhile the 1/506th Airborne, led by Lt. Roger Leasure
reinforced the area by attacking the southern side of the hill.17 After four days of heavy fighting,
more reinforcements were called in to surround Hill 937, now being called “Hamburger Hill” by
US troops, and began a complete attack. Along with continuous artillery support, the 187th

R.L. Reed. “Combat After Action Report (Apache Snow).” September 16, 1969, 17, box 00,
folder 1, Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.
https://vva.vietnam.ttu.edu/repositories/2/digital_objects/332187.
17
Reed. “Combat After Action Report,” 17.
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attacked the north, the 506th the south, the 501st from the northeast, and the ARVN from the
southeast.18 By noon on May 20th the hill was taken. An after-action report written by Control
Headquarters Reporting Officer R.L. Reed, describes the objectives of the procedure: “the 101st
Airborne Division is to occupy the northern A Shau Valley on D-Day, block enemy escape into
Laos, and conduct operations in zone to destroy enemy forces and installations.”19 The 101st
airborne met these objectives. Another after-battle report written about a month after Hamburger
Hill acknowledged the success of US military effectiveness. In his report, Major General John
Wright Jr. “indicated the thoroughness of planning and preciseness of execution of the Division
airmobile operation. The days’ activity pointed out the tremendous influence of the helicopter on
modern military operations.”20 Combat reports, using the military’s code name, ‘Apache Snow,’
described the exact effectiveness of the battle as follows:
RESULTS: The objectives of Operation Apache Snow were successfully carried
out. A series of mutually supporting fire support bases from FSB Currahee to the south to
FSB Razor on the north was established. The multi-battalion combined operation in the
south was a campaign in which the enemy was found, fixed, and methodically destroyed.
The 9th Marine regiment successfully blocked on the north, thus denying the enemy
reinforcing entrance or withdrawal from the A Shau Valley along the Da Krong Valley
Road, and interdicted the road to deter enemy use of it in the future. The result of this
operation was the destruction of the combat effectiveness of the maneuver battalions of
the 29th NVA regiment and its Headquarters and Technical Unites, which forced the
broken elements to retreat across the border into Laos. It also denied them use of the
northern A Shau Valley as either a staging area for attack or as a storage area for
supplies.”21

Jay Schaerrbutt, “An Account of Hill 937 Battle,” Washington Newspaper, May 24, 1969, as
transcribed by Joseph B. Conmy, Office of the Commanding General, “Battle of Dong Ap Bia—
Hill 937,” (San Francisco, May 24, 1969), 5, box 0008, folder 1508, Vietnam Center and
Archive, Texas Tech University.
https://vva.vietnam.ttu.edu/repositories/2/digital_objects/539489.
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John Wright Jr. “Operation ‘Apache Snow’: 101st Airborne.” Military History Department.
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U.S. forces carried out all missions successfully and only “cost the lives of 48 Americans
and nearly 600 North Vietnamese.”22 Although the number of casualties continues to vary (with
a discrepancy between 48, 50, or 65 Americans versus 600 or 630 North Vietnamese), all sources
cite a drastic difference between American and North Vietnamese losses. According to the troops
that fought in the jungles, the battle was a success. Arthur Wiknik, a soldier who took the hill on
May 20th described his satisfaction with the victory: “Once we had taken the hill there were GIs
everywhere and I felt pretty good. You know, we had been part of a—we didn’t realize that at
the time but, you know, when I think back now that was part of history so it’s pretty neat to be a
part of history.”23 Combat reports, high ranking military officials, and soldiers frequently echoed
the battle’s success. Yet, even so, controversy in the home front arose almost immediately.
Journalist coverage and public reaction paint a different picture of the victory. Many reporters
like Ward Just and David Hoffman of the Washington Post, Terence Smith of the New York
Times, and The World questioned the tactical significance of the battle and the use of
conventional tactics rather than simply utilizing modern airstrike technology. Some soldiers on
the hill even voiced their opinions. Specialist SPC, Anthony Toll commented, “after all these air
and artillery strikes, these gooks [North Vietnamese] are still in there fighting. All of us are
wondering why they [the Americans] just can’t pull back and B-52 [bomb] the hill. I’ve lost a lot
of buddies up there. Not many guys can take it much longer.”24 No one can dispute the brutality
of the battle. It makes sense that some soldiers felt more airstrikes could have been used to save
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human life as they trudged up the hill. After all, the nickname, Hamburger Hill, comes from the
meat grinder appearance of the hill from constant combat and artillery fire. Toll’s remarks
revealed the trauma of warfare and the American questioning of war as a problem solver, but the
use of bombing had already been a prominent feature of the battle. The US military used artillery
strikes and napalm every day—over 1,100 tons of artillery during the span of the ten-day battle.25
Air support was in frequent use, yet, the North Vietnamese had dug into concrete bunkers
making airstrikes less effective. This is why generals argued that conventional, raiding tactics
were necessary to take the hill. General Melvin Zais contested; “I don’t know how many wars
we have to go through to convince people that bombing alone can never do the trick. They [the
NVA] were dug in too deep, they were protected.”26 The military felt strongly that they had
successfully taken Hill 937 with comprehensive strategy. In contrast, politicians and journalists
perceived the battle as brutal and senseless, which caused the American public’s opposition.
Meanwhile, soldiers struggled to maintain morale for a controversial war. Therefore, newspaper
outlets, television and radio broadcasts, and magazine articles played an important role in the
Vietnam War. The media created an intricate web of awareness between politics, the public, and
the military—each influencing and shaping one another to create a highly controversial historical
period. Perhaps the most significant factor during the Vietnam War was journalist’s coverage of
different events informing the American home front.
Due to the controversial results of the Battle of Hamburger Hill, this event marked an
important obstacle for the US military in the Vietnam War. In 1968, the Tet Offensive sparked,
perhaps, the beginning of a collective American disregard for continued military efforts in
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southeast Asia. One year later, Hamburger Hill further solidified the general sense of futility.
Despite the victory for US forces, the public and politicians focused on the descriptions of
destruction, death, and senselessness. The media, politicians, and military were simply too
disconnected, and each were focusing on entirely different objectives. Humanity was continuing
to be a feature of debate, and meanwhile, there was still a responsibility to fight for traditional
American ideologies. This inadequate balancing act between the three parties resulted in
different perceptions of the battles, and therefore a disappointing response to an American
victory. Both the Tet Offensive and Hamburger Hill create a solid portrayal of the complicated
nature of the Vietnam War. As US forces fought hard to achieve victory in Vietnam, the most
challenging battle to come was the support from the American public and politicians—a
continuous challenge for military staff. Eventually, the U.S. military decided to abandon the
Hamburger Hill. This decision further suggested the futility of the Vietnam War. Parents, family
and friends of those lost and injured on Hamburger Hill surely took no comfort in relinquishing a
geographic landmark at such a high human cost. It showed that even as successes occurred in the
war, victory depended on a comprehensive effort—both militarily and on the home front.
Obstacles obstructing military success far outweighed advantages. The Battle of Hamburger Hill
illuminates the obstacles including; journalist’s coverage, political limitations, and public
dissent.
Section Two: ‘Aid to the Enemy:’ Reporters and Sensationalized News

As the United States witnessed the escalation of a war that divided the nation, journalistic
coverage influenced the perspectives of the public, politicians, and soldiers. While civilians at
home experienced the realities of war through their television sets, soldiers abroad became
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increasingly frustrated with antiwar news coverage. In 1969, Col. James Campbell stated, “it is
my contention that such irresponsible reporting is absolutely devastating to the morale of all
soldiers. It is also my contention that such reporting in the Stars and Stripes of all publications is
of tremendous aid and comfort to the enemy.”27 Newspaper editorials caused, according to some
military staff, the public to lose faith in US forces, and this undermined some GIs’ morale.
Military officials like Campbell cast blame on the media, whose news coverage of American
suffering and senselessness seemingly bolstered Viet Cong momentum. One soldier expressed
his frustration claiming: “They [protestors] took it out on the warriors instead of the politicians
that, you know, created the situation. It was just anti-war sentiment. That anti-war sentiment was
carried over and aimed at the kid that got drafted…”28 Throughout the Vietnam era, the public,
politicians, and military inadequately worked together. As antiwar movements intensified,
politicians were forced to attempt pleasing every party including American citizens, military
goals, and the world image. As a result, the military experienced strategic limitations so as to
satisfy the public and maintain a stance in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the soldiers abroad faced the
consequences of a limited war. General Fred Weyand warned, “what the military did not realize
was that the American public had always been the greatest limitation on the use of military
force.”29 Antiwar sentiments increased, and President Lyndon Johnson announced he would not
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pursue re-election in 1968. He explained, “I felt I was being chased on all sides by a giant
stampede coming at me from all directions.”30
The Vietnam War forced many military and political officials to make decisions to
appease the public, the media, the soldiers, and the rest of the watching world. For example, in
the 1969 Battle of Hamburger Hill, the military frequently felt pressure from politicians and the
public. Although the battle was a victory for the United States, the opening sentence in the
Washington Post Foreign Service newspaper the next day wrote, “the Army commanders who
ordered, approved and led what Sen. Edward M. Kennedy described as a ‘senseless and
irresponsible’ charge up Hamburger Hill disputed the Senator today.”31 This statement was
misleading in that U.S. forces lost about 50 men, whereas the NVA lost over 600. Combat
reports consistently stated this figure, yet, media outlets posted instead the frustrations of the
war. Ted Kennedy lamented, “how can we justify sending our boys against a hill a dozen times
or more until soldiers themselves question the madness of the action?”32 Kennedy was frustrated
with the military’s decision to continue attacking the hill even after a dozen attempts. In addition,
some newspapers made a point to reveal the tactical insignificance of the hill, likely to question
the overall morality of fighting wars. The battle may have resulted in comparatively fewer
American losses, but reporters, citizens, and politicians alike began to question the humanity of
war. To many people during this time period, a U.S. victory with few losses mattered little since
war as a whole was being questioned as both senseless and irresponsible. Another article written
by Ward Just from the Washington Post pointed out the uselessness of the war. He argued, “[It
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is] simple enough to speak of the futility of such enterprises like Hamburger Hill, where too
many men are killed and wounded to no discernible purpose… Maj. Gen. Melvin Zais should
leave the hill to the enemy, for whatever good it will do him; give it a run with B-52s, then leave
it alone. Hamburger Hill: not worth a single dead American. But that is not the way it goes in
South Vietnam. It never has. An army is fielded, and if it is a good army it fights.”33 Just
articulated his frustration with warfare in general, and he pointed out the cruelty of letting
American boys die on the front lines. His sentiments address the American unfamiliarity
regarding the realities of war. A war’s brutal nature and acceptance of lost life is often a
challenging aspect to accept, and much of the U.S. population was shocked to experience this
firsthand through the television. Moreover, Just claimed too many American soldiers were killed
at the battle, yet roughly 50 were reported dead in the combat report. Just sought an outcome in
which no American lives were lost, and this further reveals the level of unpreparedness in the
U.S. public for the realities of warfare. In addition, this article conveys the growing questioning
of war in general. More Americans began to discuss if war was a humane practice at all, further
dividing the nation in an already controversial conflict.
A similar article described the hopelessness many soldiers felt. An unnamed soldier
claimed, “There were lots of people in Bravo Company [which had born the brunt of the
casualties] who were going to refuse to go back up again. There’d been low morale, but never
before so low—because we felt it was all so senseless.”34 Many soldiers on Hamburger Hill, no
doubt, felt fearful during the battle, and as newspaper articles stressed soldiers’ insubordination
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and trauma, the military criticized the journalist’s coverage. If the public was already questioning
the morality of war, viewing miserable soldiers likely increased efforts to end the conflict. In
addition, this soldier’s opinion illustrates the controversial nature of the Vietnam era. Combat, in
general, is a harrowing endeavor for any young soldier. The ethics of nation pursuing war has
frequently been a heavily debated topic on morality and basic humanity. The Vietnam War, for
the first time, popularized and illuminated the common soldier’s realization of war. Television
was articulating every emotion a soldier felt, and even if this reality is simple truth that must be
swallowed, the U.S. was, nonetheless, shocked to witness the details of war. The media’s focus
on dismal soldiers and traumatic experiences, more than anything, reveal the lack of American
preparedness for the realities of war. But this did not deter many soldiers’ expectations for a
supportive nation and a heroic war. When their experiences failed to meet their expectations,
many GIs began to lose morale. As a result, sensationalized reports led to U.S. military
disappointment and anger with the media and lack of support back home. Col. R.D. Heinl
pointed out, “In this war—at least as seen by most experienced soldiers—U.S. television has
wittingly or unwittingly served in considerable part as a weapon for mass destruction of national
will and morale...Some would say that, in the Vietnamese War, we have in fact been defeating
ourselves by television.”35 These are strong statements to make about the impact of the media
and antiwar sentiments on the result of the Vietnam War, and Heinl’s comments express the
perspectives some military personnel had of the media. According to some military officials, the
media was affecting American morale.
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Six months after the Battle of Hamburger Hill, Col. Rodger Bankson gave a speech to the
New Jersey Press Association. He addressed the contradictions of having so many reporters in
Vietnam, yet, the public remained uninformed about some factual realities soldiers experienced.
Bankson explained, “Anywhere from 450 to 650 news media representatives from every branch
of public communications and from two to three dozen countries may be accredited to the
Government of Vietnam and to our military command there at any given time…But despite their
efforts and the efforts of dedicated and aggressive newsmen, the American public is singularly
uninformed or ill-informed about that many-faceted war. Why is this so? Why is there confusion
and doubt when by every valid, meaningful measurement we are winning in Vietnam, and have
been for more than three years?”36 Bankson argued that sensationalism in news, amateur
reporters, and even laziness in the American public caused a degree of misinformation.37 In other
words, the Vietnam War introduced televised news coverage into the battlefield, and now
viewers would be able to see exactly what happened at certain events. As a result, this required a
more educated public that was capable of skepticism and questioning the information they
received at the time. The general public in the 1960s and 1970s—as well as today—often blindly
accepts what is presented to them on the television which creates a problem of acquiring full
knowledge in controversial topics. In both senses, publicly and through the media, the military
functions in Vietnam were inadequately understood.
Military officials frequently voiced their frustration with the reporters in Vietnam. James
Westheider, an author of the Vietnam War claims “many soldiers blamed what they considered
to be biased reporting for influencing the general public, and ultimately, the government into
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believing that the war was unwinnable… One valid criticism of the media was that many
reporters rarely left the relatively safe confines of Saigon [and] wrote about the war as if they
were in a combat zone.”38 Military personnel criticized journalists for reporting dramatic stories
of battle when many rarely ventured from the safety of American bases. Thus, many military
officials questioned how media coverage could be completely accurate. In a 1982 interview,
General William Westmoreland pointed out the influence the media had on the public with
numbers of inaccurate and sensationalized stories. According to Westmoreland, “Without
censorship in war, things can get terribly confused in the public mind, and when you add that to
another first for Vietnam—television—you have an instrument that can paralyze this country,
absolutely paralyze it to where the president is unable to do what he thinks is in the national
interest.”39 Westmoreland, acknowledging America’s inexperience with a television war, still
asserted that censorship was sometimes necessary in wartime—even with excellent journalists.
This statement reveals the controversial nature of the media in the Vietnam War. In effect, the
main debate was how much detail of military functions should be revealed to the public. This
created a difficult dispute. Press freedom and the right for the public to acquire information is a
fundamental aspect of the United States. Yet, it must also be considered how complex and even
brutal military information can be. If the public receives too much detail, it could cause
discontent and a breach of security. In all, this complication simply exposed just how prepared a
country needs to be for war—both mentally and physically. A democracy should have the right
to give information to the public, but this also means citizens must be prepared for the
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heinousness of war and educated in practices of skepticism. Even today, this controversy is still
debated.
Other military officials cited the issues with staged scenes on the television. Col. Heinl
described,
a soldier wearing the U.S. uniform states his emphatic dissatisfaction with the war
and says in effect, that if he gets out of Vietnam, he would never obey an order to return.
What the viewer saw did not just happen. The circle of soldiers had to be positioned and
assembled. For the one soldier whose views hit the desired chord, a dozen GIs may have
talked into the mike...The reporter was getting what he was asking for. He wasn’t looking
for signs of morale, discipline, fighting spirit, or patriotism. What CBS succeeded in
registering and must therefore have sought, was war-weariness, gripes, disaffection, and
soldier discontent.40

Heinl asserted that journalists were creating the messages and stories they wanted the
public to view. He argued that the media was looking for an end to the war, and thus, they
purposely worded stories to fit that message. Meanwhile, as the military became increasingly
displeased with the reporting, American citizens back home witnessed scenes of violent
engagements, demoralized soldiers, and a losing war. As a result, antiwar sentiments soon
skyrocketed. Even the manner in which military generals were portrayed was frustrating to the
military. After the Battle of Hamburger Hill, news reporters cited General Melvin Zais who
justified the attack. He claimed, “‘that hill was in my area of operations, that was where the
enemy was, that’s where I attacked him.’”41 This portrayal of Zais made him out to be a gruff
individual who cared little about human life and, likewise, did not put much thought into
decisions. Perhaps Zais did hold these characteristics, but such descriptions paint a picture of
inhumanity in warfare—which was a popular conception of the Vietnam War.
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Thus, this theme of inhumanity and moral decency had become a major question of both
the public and media. Throughout the war, the media and military were constantly disconnected.
The military stressed victory over its enemies, patriotism for troops and country, and a firm grasp
on the realities of war. Meanwhile, journalists—as well as the public—were grappling with the
moral soundness of war, brutality, and killing. It is not necessarily a matter of biased or false
reporting. It is more a different focus on the practice of war. For example, the Battle of
Hamburger Hill was an evident victory for the United States. The military and reporters on site
essentially witnessed the same events. Yet, as the military focused on victory over its enemies,
the media questioned the sense of it all. This attitude frustrated some troops, but as the U.S.
population grappled with war’s humanity, journalists similarly described violent scenes of battle,
exhausted troops, and dense jungles. Maybe this does make the reporting sensationalized, but it
also does not make it false. Instead, it shows how perspectives on certain events—while all true
in their own rights—can be completely different according to specific focus and objectives. In
short, the media and military were grappling with opposing obstacles during the Vietnam War,
and this created a divided United States.
For example, some reporters during the Vietnam War even chose to depart from
journalism. Howard Smith of the Hall Syndicate publisher announced, “in past periods around
our entry into World War II, I had the exhilarating feeling of being a tiny part in a great age of
journalism. I miss that feeling now. I believe too many reporters today are not rising to the
demands of a time that calls for especially perceptive reporting and especially judicious
interpretation of events… I believe that a big contributing factor to the confusion and frustration
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now damaging the nation’s spirit is the poorly balanced diet of journalism it is getting.”42 Smith
expressed his disapproval of the journalistic coverage against President Johnson and antiwar
sentiments, so he decided to leave the profession. No reporter, however, faced as much scathing
criticism than Walter Cronkite.

Walter Cronkite was a journalist who gained immense popularity in the media during
World War II. His pro-military stance, however, suddenly shifted in 1968. After the Tet
Offensive he asserted the Vietnam War was unwinnable. Americans, shocked at Cronkite’s
expressions of personal opinions, joined his side while others bitterly opposed his anecdotes. Ed
Moffitt, for example, wrote a letter to Cronkite years later targeting him for the altered media
coverage. Moffitt asserted, “While the damage done to your own reputation is certain, it pales
when compared to the damage done to the valiant men who fought in Vietnam and especially the
people of South Vietnam who suffered greatly under the victorious Communist troops after our
government followed your advice and withdrew.”43 Cronkite certainly carried significant
influence in shaping American public opinion. President Lyndon Johnson stated, “if I’ve lost
Cronkite, I’ve lost Middle America.”44 Some contemporaries claim that Johnson ultimately
decided to not run for reelection due to Cronkite’s followers who were dissatisfied with the war.
During the Vietnam era, many citizens who trusted Cronkite, at times embraced his assertions
against the war efforts. Meanwhile, another group of individuals began to question Cronkite’s
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influence. This shift in public opinion showed the power and responsibility reporters have during
wartime. For example, because of journalistic coverage, public opinion continuously plummeted,
and this forced political officials into a corner. They somehow had to please the public who
vehemently called for an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam, yet, simultaneously win the war
or else suffer a communist overthrow in the East. American officials sought to appease different
political perspectives.

Even as late as 2013, political and military officials expressed their animosity towards
Cronkite. Moffitt, in an article arguing the United States lost the war due to media coverage. He
opined,
imagine if CBS News and Cronkite had reported the truth about our military’s
valiant victory at Tet? Instead, most network commentators, journalists and press editors
followed the CBS anchorman’s lead and turned against the war. Most wrote under the
banner of ‘impartiality’ when in fact, many had openly lent their names and influence to
the antiwar movement. It is my honest and humble opinion America’s mainstream media
collaborated in a concerted effort to promote an ‘antiwar agenda’ which eventually
eroded American public opinion and support for the war.45
Moffitt placed specific blame on Cronkite and the media for public support to plummet,
and therefore, causing the defeat in Vietnam. After a string of letters and requests for answers,
Cronkite finally responded to Moffitt. Cronkite stated, “Regarding the TET broadcast, I made
clear that my closing comments were a personal opinion and that the previous hour-long news
broadcast was as unbiased as we could make it. I recognized sometime after the fact that the
North Vietnamese had suffered a military defeat, but this does not dictate an apology on my part
for following the precepts of responsible journalism in reporting the situation as I saw it at the
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time.”46 Cronkite argued that he stated an opinion, and had not realized, then, that Tet was a U.S.
victory. This point raises the theory that perhaps the American public passive when obtaining
information about the war. Cronkite’s admittance of being his unawareness of a U.S. victory
probes further questions about the role of national television played in American lives.
Responsible journalism calls for well-educated reports on events, not personal opinions.

One of the most pronounced responses to the Tet Offensive and the damaging narrative
of Walter Cronkite resulted in the intensification of anti-war protests. Scholar Mark Barringer’s
explains, “after Tet, American public opinion shifted dramatically, with fully half of the
population opposed to escalation.”47 Much of the increase in antiwar activity, however, is due to
the credibility gap of the era. President Johnson continuously promised a short and winnable war,
yet, when the public views clips of exploding buildings, exhausted troops, and a strong enemy
force, many began to question the credibility of Johnson’s promises, and the need for war to
contain communism. Johnson’s credibility became a focal point in the media and public
dissenters. So much so that even reporters like Howard Smith from the Hall Syndicate called out
the animosity towards Johnson. He stated,
In the realm of government, the reporter’s term, ‘credibility gap,’ is one of the
most distorting over-simplifications of the time. The President is dealing with unutterably
complex situations in which the very facts on which to base judgement may not be in for
weeks; yet we tend to call it calculated deception if he does not instantly provide
conclusive facts and admit failure… To cite a random example, I find it hard to adjust to
the suggestion of a famous TV commentator the other day that it is becoming easier to
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believe an Oriental tyrant (Ho Chi Minh) than it is to believe the President of the United
States.48
Smith argued that both the media and public took dissent too far—even opposing their
own country and President. This shows the varying nature of what it means to be American for
different people. Some, like Smith, believe loyalty and patriotism for one’s county is a crucial
role of being American. In contrast, other Americans argue that revolution and dissent are
fundamental values of American culture since rebellion is, after all, what granted American
independence in the 1700s. Both arguments contain elements of being American, but it is this
distinction that played a significant role during the Vietnam War. While Smith’s arguments for
President Johnson remain valid, it is also crucial to recognize that the administration also misled
the public. Indeed, protestors and journalists were critical towards the administration which
complicated decisions, but Americans became increasingly frustrated with the conflicting
information, broken promises, and vague objectives. Many military officials cast blame at the
antiwar movement for a failed military effort, but it is also crucial to recognize the impact of
Johnson’s credibility gap. Military endeavors need public support, but when announcements are
made that the war will be short, simple, and heroic, public dissent will follow when those
promises are unfulfilled. In all, Johnson unintentionally created too large of a credibility gap with
empty promises of a short war.
While the media’s role in affecting public perception of the conflict played an important
role during the war, broken promises and political endeavors also sparked strong dissent.
Columbia University students rallying against the war and civil rights issues, for example,
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occupied five campus buildings before being broken up by police.49 The Democratic National
Convention in August of that year turned violent when peace activists were disbanded with tear
gas and police force. The broken promises held by politicians and the violent images of warfare
on television screens forced anti-war sentiments to spread, and as a result, public distrust of the
government intensified. The public began opposing the war, but this did not come without
responses from the military. Private First-Class Michael Brown, for example, wanted “all the
people back home to know that protesting the war will do no good. It’s too late to protest, so stop
marching and give us a little more support.”50 As college students and activists fought their own
battles for peace and equality on the home front, young men risked their lives in Vietnam—all
while feeling a lack of support from back home. Indeed, as protestors raged over the political
shortcomings back home, and passionately called for an end to the war, soldiers still fought a
foreign battle in Southeast Asia.

Section 3—Anti-war and Pro-war Perspectives among Vietnam War Soldiers

“I feel that there is too much talk of despair. I warned you of that before I left. Above all, this is
a war of mind and spirit. And it is a war which can be won no matter what present circumstances
are. For us to despair would be a great victory for the enemy. We must stand strong and unafraid
and give heart to an embattled and confused people. This cannot be done if America loses heart.
Please don't let them back where you are [United States] sell me down the river with talk of
despair and defeat. Talk instead of steadfastness, loyalty and of victory—for we must and we can
win here. There is no backing out of Vietnam, for it will follow us everywhere we go. We have
drawn the line here and the America we all know and love best is not one to back away.”51
—Captain James Polk Spruill, Letter to his Wife, 1964
49
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The ranging perspectives of the soldiers during this turbulent time remain understudied in
the literature of the Vietnam War. With every year the war raged on, public sentiment
diminished, and frustrations were vocalized both in political circles and among journalists. Many
soldiers became disenchanted with the military and war efforts in Southeast Asia, but other
soldiers also expressed frustrations with the lack of support back home. Soldiers criticized
political pressure and policies that undermined military decisions and strategies that resulted in
low morale. For example, after U.S. Command halted bombing and muzzled its troops in
November of 1968, George Gensel Special Fourth Class expressed his concern: “Look what
happened when we slowed the bombing before. Things got a whole lot worse. I don’t think this
is the right move. There should be another way, but I don’t know the answer.”52 In many ways,
this individual expression from a soldier in Vietnam, highlights the complexities of the war.
While many GIs in Vietnam felt American strategy was inefficient, the resolution was too
complicated for any one amendment. The Vietnam War caused challenges for different parties,
whether it be the military, politicians, or the public at home. Furthermore, the war’s procedures
became even more complicated with the role of media.
In the Vietnam War—the first televised war—antiwar sentiments overshadow American
collective memory.53 Some military officials expressed their dissatisfaction with the media and
opinions at home for skewing interview comments and representing the military in a negative
light. In a 1982 interview, General William Westmoreland maintained, “during the Vietnam
conflict the media played a role in turning public sentiment against the war with numbers of
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inaccurate and sensationalized stories. Walter Cronkite ought to understand that point very well
since his network, CBS, did much to paint our Vietnam War in negative terms.” He continued,
“note that 14 years later, Mr. Cronkite was still describing Tet as a defeat for our side, despite the
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. That is inexcusable.”54 Westmoreland’s interview
highlights the military’s growing frustration with the media representations of the war and the
lack of support from home. Westmoreland certainly had his own failures and mistakes in the
Vietnam War ranging from lack of creativity and focus on conventional tactics, but he asserted
that the media caused problems between the military and public support. Airman Richard W.
Harper lamented that he did not “appreciate the fact that Americans are being killed, while our
government at home is making half an effort to win this war…We need more motivation from
our fellow Americans back home, and we also need to fight this war like it should be fought.”55
Harper was disappointed with both the U.S. government and the American public’s lack of
commitment. This shows an expectation for World War II mobilization and support. Many
soldiers, like Harper, felt the war could not be won due to the imposed political restrictions and a
halfhearted commitment. While some soldiers criticized political restrictions, others cast blame
at the protestors. Private Floyd Evans requested that “the people back in the states would cut out
some of that protesting against the war. Everybody should get together and give us men a
helping hand over here.”56 Evans argued that the protesting in the states was useless, and that
providing support and assistance to the American troops would be more purposeful. Another
soldier revealed his frustration with protestors by admitting he “would rather fight to stop
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communism in South Vietnam than in American cities like Kincaid, Humbolt Blue Mound, or
Kansas City.”57 More still, in a letter to his pen pal, Sgt. David Miller explained, “this mail we
get really helps the morale of the troops, especially from the college students since all we hear
about is the stupid Communist students protesting.”58 Miller’s assumption shows that many
protestors were characterized as communists simply for dissenting an American endeavor.
Indeed, there were some communist sympathizers in antiwar movements, but most simply
desired peace. Thus, Miller’s criticism reveals how the military viewed antiwar movements.
Many soldiers learned about the problems back home and believed wherever they went, conflict
surrounded them. In addition, soldiers understood the conflicts at home such as the civil rights
movements, political scandals, and antiwar protests indicated a lack of focus by the American
people. As the number of casualties skyrocketed in the dense jungles of Vietnam, the military
lost its direction and experienced a decline in soldiers’ morale.
Many soldiers experienced conflict both on the battlefield and on the home front. Some,
like Lance Corporal Jack Swender, saw an opportunity to educate the South Vietnamese. He
asserted, “Communism cannot thrive in a society of people who know the whole truth. This war
is not going to be won in a day or even a year. This war and others like it will only be won when
the children of the nation are educated and can grow in freedom to rule themselves. Last year
alone 4,700 teachers and priests in South Vietnam were killed. This we are trying to stop – this is
our objective.”59 Swender was inspired to give other civilizations the opportunity to be free like

Jack S. Swender, “Letter to Swender to Aunt and Uncle 1965,” (New York: Simon and
Schuster Inc. From Dear America: Letters Home from Vietnam). Accessed November 9, 2017.
http://jackiewhiting.net/Collab/VietnamDocs/VNLetters.htm.
58
David Miller, “Letter to Carol Thompson,” December 15, 1965, Accessed through Carol
Thompson Collection, Folder 3, Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University.
https://vva.vietnam.ttu.edu/repositories/2/resources/1967.
59
Swender, “Letter to Aunt and Uncle,” 1.
57

Fox 35
Americans; he argued that education was the key for Vietnamese children to pursue freedom. In
his mind, the war would achieve this objective. Others, like Staff Sergeant Benjamin Estes, were
hopeful for true peace. He commented, “I just can’t see letting all those sacrifices be in vain. I’m
willing to stay longer to get the thing really settled. If the war stops, it has to truly stop so there
will be a permanent peace.”60 Estes revealed his sense of duty to complete the job so that the
many men who lost their lives would not be in vain. Another Captain commented how much the
South Vietnamese appreciated America’s military presence. He maintained, “You can't imagine
the comradeship and gratitude of these men when an American stands with them through danger.
It seems to bring heart to them. They cheer and wave and yell ‘Dia-uy,’ which is their word for
Captain.”61 According to this Captain, South Vietnamese, at first, embraced the American
presence. At the beginning of the Vietnam War, Americans supported the mission, some South
Vietnamese were appreciative, and the goals were clear. But with time, these objectives faded
and appreciation for American troops steadily subsided. Thus, American morale began its
gradual decline. Likewise, South Vietnamese responses to American military presence varied.
Some, like the Captain described, were satisfied with the assistance, while others openly
criticized the invasive presence. Even so, some soldiers like W.O. Thomas Minerva felt it was
their duty to fight communism. He wrote in a letter: “We all miss our families. We all feel
though that if we don’t stop the Communists here, our children will be fighting them in the
U.S.A.”62 Minerva acknowledged the fear of the spread of communism during the time. Many
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Americans felt if communism was not actively subdued, then it would inevitably spread into
their western culture. Thus, Minerva argued that the was a just cause to protect future
generations of America.
While many soldiers maintained optimism during the war, others began to feel bitter
about the vague reasons for American involvement in Vietnam. Corporal George Skakel wrote to
a student newspaper explaining; “most guys harbor some notion of duty—what’s gotta be done
gotta be done. The main issue is personal survival. A few of us, like myself, hate the war for its
own sake, as a war, a human travesty, for the sake of unscrupulous motives.”63 Some soldiers
like Skakel entered Vietnam and experienced the true horrors of war—a common response in
any conflict. The distinction in this attitude is that soldiers began to lose sight of the objective.
For example, while the enemy in World War II was clear, the true “enemy” during the Vietnam
War remained far less evident. It did not take long for the media, the public, and even soldiers to
question the necessity of American involvement. In his book on differing opinions of the
military, historian David Flores noted, “tensions over support or opposition to the Vietnam War
were due in part to the complex ways in which the war was rationalized politically and fought
militarily. As the rate at which casualties in Vietnam accumulated, and local communities began
to feel the human impact of war, individuals grew to question political justifications for
continuing to fight in Vietnam.”64 Similarly, many soldiers who became frustrated with public
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support, directed their grievances at the general war effort. For example, some soldiers struggled
to compare the tragedies at home to the tragedies in warfare.
After losing his close friend, Lt. Scott, in combat, Sergeant Philip Woodall wrote,
“tonight the nation mourns the death of Martin Luther King. Not me, I mourn the death of the
real leaders for peace, the people who give the real sacrifice, people like Lt. Scott.” He
continued, “tonight as the nation mourns Dr. King, they drink their cold beer, turn on their air
conditioner and watch their TV. We who mourn the deaths over here will set up ambushes, pull
our guard and eat our C-rations.”65 Soldiers like Woodall struggled to compare the tragedies
back home with the losses in Vietnam. To Woodall and many others, the true heroes of the
United States were the men who fought and died for their country. The reality of war stripped
many young men of their idealism, leaving some soldiers, like Woodall, bitter over the nation’s
mourning of Martin Luther King Jr., and not the thousands in Vietnam. In effect, the U.S.
military staff believed that had abandoned the military’s priorities abroad. While the public
witnessed brutal warfare and distant jungles through their televisions, American GIs were also
keenly aware of the American population viewing their military engagements alongside domestic
events like the Martin Luther King Jr. assassination and the debates surrounding presidential
campaigns. This gave soldiers the opportunity to witness the dissent towards the war, and news
reports of American war efforts. Fractions of soldiers supported the antiwar agenda while other
groups of the military became frustrated with the meager political and public support.
The unique perspective of the Vietnam War represents the group of soldiers who decided
to join the antiwar movement. Many soldiers started to question the war’s objectives, arguing the
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war was a misguided and unjust political endeavor. Soldiers found refuge sharing their
perspectives at coffeehouses and in underground newspapers. For example, in an unofficial
newspaper called Counterpoint, soldiers argued that political decisions were unjustified, blaming
politicians’ capitalistic motivations and their disregard for soldiers’ achievements abroad. An
article describes, “the Brass [high ranking officials] are only out for their own gain, and maybe a
profitable kickback. Of course, if asked about it, the lifers scream patriotism and national
defense.”66 Many antiwar soldiers argued that high ranking officials cared only about making
money and their own personal gain, making many GIs feel, even more so, that military
endeavors were futile. Similarly, soldiers’ coffeehouses near their bases allowed GIs to discuss
the war with other antiwar activists.67 The transition from a patriotic soldier to an active member
of antiwar movements highlight the complexities of the war. Soldiers began questioning longheld traditions of discipline and authority in the military. In the Counterpoint, antiwar GIs
argued, “American soldiers die in Vietnam every day, yet when a GI chooses to speak out
against such senseless slaughter, he is labeled a ‘troublemaker’ or a threat to morale. Vietnam
means trouble for any GI. We didn’t make the war. A president’s foreign policy did it.”68
American soldiers were increasingly casting aside traditional military expectations and instead
boldly pointed out: “the present administration and the military-industrial complex… are the
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troublemakers, not us.”69 Though it is not uncommon for soldiers to wish for the conflict to end,
the Vietnam War is unique with its organized movement of GIs joining the antiwar protests.
Lieutenant General James Gavin recommended, “we bring hostilities in Vietnam to an end as
quickly and reasonably as we can, and that we devote those vast expenditures of our national
resources to dealing with our domestic problems.”70 Not only were citizens protesting the war,
but also a number of GIs organized to end the conflict as quickly as possible. This not only
reveals the futility of the war effort, but it also displays a powerful example of how support in
general represents a crucial component of winning a war. Vague motives, American
unpreparedness for the realities of war, and media coverage certainly played a role in the minds
of the citizens at home, but all of these factors also affected the GIs in Vietnam. As a result, the
American military experienced one of the most organized and widespread opposition movements
during antiwar protests.
The problems of media coverage and scarce public support during warfare came to light
even more so after the Battle of Hamburger Hill in 1969. After fighting for ten brutal days,
American troops were exhilarated to have finally taken the hard-fought hill. Yet, shortly
thereafter military officials decided to abandon the hill and kept moving. This severely damaged
the morale of soldiers’ like Arthur Wiknik who fought at the hill and lost comrades along the
way. He recalled, “Shortly after that, we were kind of disappointed. We figured that the location
could have been used as a fire base or some military installation, you know, American military
installation could have been placed on that hill. Something could be done there because we
fought very hard for that piece of ground. Roughly sixty-five Americans lost their lives there, so
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to just abandon it like that was a real kick in the pants. That was very, very discouraging and
some of the guys voiced that right away.”71 American troops were demoralized after abandoning
a hill they fought so hard to win. Wiknik struggled to understand the sense in losing comrades if
the strategy was aimed at abandoning the hill anyway. Thus, many troops, journalists, and
politicians alike began to question why military officials decided to leave the successfully won
hill. Colonel Harry Summers believed the site was abandoned because of the reactions at home.
He argued, “given the public and political reaction to Hamburger Hill, a change in war-fighting
policy was not long in coming. In order to hold down casualties, what had been a policy of
keeping ‘maximum pressure’ on the enemy was changed to one of ‘protective reaction’—
fighting only when threatened by enemy attack.”72 Public and political reactions were at times
negative in response to Hamburger Hill, and military officials regarded public opposition as an
obstacle to their decision-making. Private Robert Scales later commented: “I mean Ted Kennedy
is going ballistic in the halls of the Senate over this wastage of lives in Hamburger Hill. So then
you had the additional pressure, political pressures, that I didn’t feel but our bosses felt, that to
back away without taking the hill, with all the grief we were getting back home—and remember
what ‘69 was like...By August we were out of there, because the price of losing soldiers on
theses hills was just too high a price to pay after the publicity of Hamburger Hill.”73
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The Battle of Hamburger Hill demonstrated the American military’s strength; Americans
lost roughly 50-65 men while the NVA suffered 630 casualties. In addition, the mission’s
objectives of conquering the hill and cutting off connecting roads were met, yet, American
newspapers continued to portray the event as a senseless effort. This coverage would be
especially frustrating due to the number of journalists at the battle. Roger Borroel of the 101st
Airborne noted that by the “time the fact that the major fight was on, the whole place was filled
with Associated Press correspondents.”74 Many military officials, thus, began to question how
such a strong media presence reported exaggerated and inaccurate stories. Colonel Joseph
Conmy articulated in a 1990 interview that the “the controversy surrounding the battle was
generated stateside by politicians and members of the press who wanted the war to end but
seemed to have no real solution for ending it. However well-intentioned their criticisms, the net
results were the enshrinement of inaccuracy, harassment of the troops and denigration of
Vietnam service.”75 Conmy argued that the press and politicians unintentionally undermined the
morale of soldiers in Vietnam. Indeed, some soldiers were quick to complain about the media,
but even with the journalistic coverage, more American GIs were disappointed toward the range
of responses back home. When men on leave like Thomas Petty ordered a beer in California,
they were told the military would not be served there. Petty criticized the ‘anti-war sentiment’
and explained, “They didn’t like military people in San Francisco in 1969.”76 Another soldier
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like Gonzalo Baltazar described the disappointment many soldiers felt when their excitement to
return state side was met with public animosity. He explained, “we’re getting off the plane and
there was a fence around there and protestors out there throwing tomatoes at us, yelling at us,
‘Baby killers,’ and ‘War mongers,’ and I thought, ‘Man this is our home country right here’…
So you really got a bitter feeling towards the Americans who were knocking us down.”77 Both
returning soldiers experienced the public animosity towards the American military. The two
descriptions highlight the effect antiwar sentiments had on soldiers’ morale. As dissent towards
troops intensified, American soldiers struggled to find purpose in serving their country.
Some of these statements illustrate how the Vietnam War became to represent the
disconnect between the American public and the military. By 1969, a growing number of
American citizens opposed the war and became increasingly bitter and distrustful of the military.
Likewise, American forces continuously experienced mounting frustration with public support,
and a growing number of dissatisfied troops. Both the public and the military are in a constant
balancing act of support. The American military requires the backing of fellow Americans to
succeed, and the public expects a stable and strong military to protect American values. In the
Vietnam era, the balancing act struggled to carry the weight. The disconnect between the military
and public can especially be articulated through the fact that most of the public—even today—
was unaware of how important morale was for military success. In general, many civilians are
far removed from the experiences, functions, and personalities of the military. Therefore, a
disconnect in simply understanding the impact of public support for the military is a problem that
surfaces in the past as well as today.
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Soldiers returning home displayed a wide range of different perspectives on the war.
David Flores explains, “many veterans do describe simply ‘getting over it,’ and remaining strong
in their conviction that the war was a ‘just cause,’ vital to preserving democracy and the
American way of life. But other Vietnam veterans argue that they returned completely opposed
to the war.”78 Much of the opposing opinions among veterans can be attributed to the American
glorification of World War II heroes. Americans cast warfare in a black-and-white manner. The
United States fought for freedom, democracy, and glory on the battlefield and thus, the enemy
was perceived as a clear “bad-guy.”79 Thus, many soldiers became disillusioned with the realities
of war when they arrived in Vietnam. Likewise, public support for Vietnam differed compared to
American memories of World War II parades and movies. While some Americans respected
warfare and understood the realities of battle, others did not understand the full scope of what
war was truly like. Therefore, Americans began to question objectives in Vietnam and the Cold
War as a whole.
Shifting political aims and a growing number of casualties during the war resulted in
negative opinions of the Vietnam conflict. Even so, historians today are left pondering what the
outcome may have looked like in Vietnam if U.S. support at home had remained strong. The
perspectives of soldiers in Vietnam who felt their sacrifice for their country was not appreciated
or supported add a critical dimension to our understanding of the war and the military.

Section 4—Military Leadership and Fighting a Political War
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Military leadership shaped important stages during the Vietnam War. While antiwar
movements continued to place pressure on politicians, military leaders also confronted many
challenges, including limitations to decision-making during battles in addition to managing U.S.
troops on the ground. Thus, military officials dealt with intricately difficult decisions that shaped
the outcomes of the war. Meanwhile, politicians sought to silence negative publicity and
maintain dominance in Vietnam by attempting to please the public and win an unpopular war.
The military and political leadership failed to work together as an effective unit. After the
1969 Battle of Hamburger Hill, many military officials condemned Senator Ted Kennedy’s
comments about their “senseless and irresponsible” actions. In a New York Times piece,
journalist Terence Smith explained, “They believe he is criticizing them for following orders.
‘His complaint should be registered with the White House, not the military,’ one officer said.
‘We have no orders to carry out even a partial stand down.’”80 Following political criticism,
many officers were forced to defend their decisions at Hamburger Hill. When asked why they
did not retreat and simply use bombs, three officers replied that retreating would have invited the
enemy to increase reinforcements, improve stockpile supplies, and give up territory they had
fought hard to win.81 In addition, General Melvin Zais asserted, “To order the three-mile
pullback...Would have demoralized men who had fought hard for the already occupied hillside.
Such a retreat would have also made it easier for the enemy units to escape back to Laos.”82
Numerous officers remained adamant that the decisive attack at Hamburger Hill was a crucial
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victory and that retreat was not an option. Meanwhile, newspaper and television coverage voiced
their concerns about these military decisions and inadequately conveyed the strategic challenges
military personnel faced on site.
Instead, news coverage centered more on the brutality of the battle, focusing on the
casualties, tragedies, and senselessness. Although the battle was certainly a brutal endeavor, such
reporting left military officials like General Zais reiterating that they “didn’t consider them
[casualties] high at all. The fight was a tremendous, gallant, victory. We decimated a large NVN
unit and people are acting as if it were a catastrophe.”83 Even years later, officers like Colonel
Joseph Conmy insisted on the significance of the battle and greater need of public support. He
commented, “I believe it would be unfair to let the families of the dead believe that their loved
ones were killed in a senseless operation, the main purpose of which was to win promotions for
career officers.” He continued, “we did not take the hill only to abandon it, as it is often claimed.
It was used continuously as a landing zone after the battle, though nothing was to be gained by
sitting on a barren hilltop… It probably saved thousands of American and South Vietnamese
lives. When US troops were called home, they were able to withdraw in good order from a
secure area.”84 Conmy argued that, contrary to popular belief, the hill was not abandoned. It was,
instead, used as a landing zone to send American troops home or to secure bases. Conmy’s
statement brought to light that the interpretations of Hamburger Hill varied widely. Popular
memory of Hamburger Hill recalls a total abandonment of the hill, making the battle appear
senseless, but Conmy argued it was used as a crucial landing zone. Similarly, Major General
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Robert Scales also argued the hill’s significance and success by explaining, “It was an attempt by
the 101st Airborne Division to control the routes of entry from Cambodia off the Ho Chi Minh
Trail into the arteries that led into Quay and so forth. So it was a key battle, and it was fought
very tenaciously because the NVA regiments that were there were very good. The 29th
Regiment, of course, comes to mind. They were very professional and very dedicated—hard,
hard, hard soldiers.”85 These military representatives argued the hill was a tremendous victory
and tactically significant for the United States. Many newspapers, however, portrayed the battle
as a futile attempt that cost the lives of many soldiers. Both arguments hold a grain of truth.
While the military victory was apparent, in the grand scheme of the war, the battle ultimately
achieved little. If anything, it created heightened dissents against the war. Yet, the battle was a
success, and if coverage had been more favorable toward the engagement, perhaps momentum
could have shifted in the United States’ favor.
In all, the military did not work effectively with the media, and thus, the public
increasingly lost faith in the war. The media and military each had different obstacles to
overcome—the military sought victory and American support, while the home front struggled to
find a purpose for the war and its morality. The\ military’s transition from justifying decisions to
the public was a new factor to fighting wars. Military officials required the approval of not only
politicians, but the public at home before implementing decisions. In his article on the politics of
Vietnam, Jonathan Caverley argues that this trend has become typical of democracies fighting
small wars. He asserts that “democracies build firepower-intensive, low-manpower militaries to
reduce the number and/or exposure to risks of soldiers, but consequently they must rely on

Robert H. Scales, “Lessons of Vietnam: Hamburger Hill,” interview by Harry Kreisler and
Thomas Barnes, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, 2004,
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Scales/scales-con5.html.
85

Fox 47
higher and less discriminating levels of violence, a policy that leads to criticism from the
educated middle class. This cost aversion results in a ‘post-heroic warfare’ employed by Western
democracies conducting non-existential wars in which their readiness to sacrifice is relatively
low.”86 In short, countries like the United States often rely on expensive firepower in small wars
to simultaneously save American lives and please voters. Yet, this leads to inefficient
mobilization for support and ineffective tactics against guerrillas or terrorists. In the late 1950s,
General Maxwell Taylor echoed this point stating that the United States required enough
“political, military, economic and moral strength sufficient to the Communist Bloc to renounce
or refrain from all forms of aggression.”87 In other words, the United States could not simply rely
on military power to win a war. Countries needed the combined strength of its economy, political
support, public morale, as well as soldiers’ morale. In order to achieve this, military officials like
Taylor have theorized that the military should work more cohesively with the media. If a solid
relationship of both promotion and responsible truth can be attained, then future conflicts and
patriotism may be more successful. Either way, this recommendation did not materialize during
the 1970s.
This problem affected both the Korean War and the Vietnam War—and continues to
shape conflicts today. During the 1960s and 1970s, military officials were quick to voice
frustrations with public support and political restrictions, but they did not necessarily link their
concerns to a critique of small wars. For example, early during the war Captain James Spruill
accepted that “one of our biggest enemies now will be impatience and despair in America
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itself.”88 According to other military officials, this statement rang true. Terence Smith, a military
reporter for the New York Times explained, “[military] officers in particular, seem to feel
strongly that continued conventional military action is worthwhile, and that it is producing
increasingly valuable results in Vietnam. They still rankle about the restrictions that were placed
on them from the beginning, at the fact that they have not been permitted to pursue the enemy
into base areas in neighboring Cambodia and Laos, and at the fact that the bombing of the North
was halted.”89 Public and political outcries caused battle tactics to shift after Hamburger Hill.
The “maximum pressure” on the enemy had transitioned into protective responses. American
forces were ordered to employ search and destroy missions and retaliate only when the enemy
presented threatening intentions. Furthermore, helicopter pilots could only return fire on the
enemy if the targets were in the open, and clearance for B-52 support involved a “laundry list” of
checkpoints before authorization.90 Even so, military officials insisted they were “still under
orders to pursue the enemy relentlessly, using every tactic and weapon at their command, [and]
to deny the North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops any strategic advantage as a result of the halt
in bombing.”91 This statement reveals a passive military strategy in Vietnam. Denying the enemy
strategic advantage differs from actively pursuing a victory. Since American troops were only
permitted to pursue the enemy 50 miles from their base, many times Viet Cong forces would
escape into Cambodia or Laos to recuperate and further frustrate U.S. forces. Soldier, John
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Bellweg criticized that the American troops should have fully mobilized and pushed forward
with the mindset that anything north was the enemy, and the south was friendly.92
Morale of military personnel diminished with the strategic limitations and the
intensification of antiwar protests, thus, the war efforts in Vietnam lost momentum. The war in
itself had evolved into a political dilemma. After the decision to halt further bombing, a political
spokesman maintained, “the bombing halt was a political matter, not military.”93 This statement
highlights the political focus on the Vietnam conflict, and it reveals the obstacles military
officials faced with strategic decisions. Nevertheless, many American soldiers regarded bombing
as an ineffective strategy, and conventional methods of warfare would secure more success.
Another soldier, Gerald Kumpf, lamented “the whole bombing routine was just a wasted
exercise, a waste of money and time.”94 Kumpf explained that they were restricted on the targets
they were allowed to destroy, and the joke around B-52 bombers was they were only intended to
make the “rubble bounce.” He continued, “I mean here you are… Trying to win a war and there
are all these restrictions, all these rules, yet the Viet Cong, they don’t have any rules.”95 Too
many American soldiers believed their efforts were undermined.
The restrictions and criticisms placed on military leaders in the Vietnam War inspired
frustrations toward the war, politicians, and a lack of support at home. David White, for example,
commented he “didn’t have much respect for U.S. policy at the time. Actually, I think they were
scared they were going to get another China [intervention]… It’s disheartening to think you’ve
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got an excellent military, you think you’re doing an excellent job and they put a leash on you.”96
Even today, many military officials continue to assert that one of the main factors leading to
defeat involved political restrictions, limited media representations, and declining public
support.97 Military officials observed the war’s shift to an institution through which “political
considerations frequently outweigh[ed] military ones.”98 Military leaders continue to disapprove
of this change. Due to this evolution in the relationship between the military and political
leadership, officers experienced significant challenges, on top of dealing with the complexities of
fighting guerrilla tactics in Vietnam’s jungles.
It is worth noting that military and political objectives are often fundamentally different.
Throughout history, military and political leaders have frequently disagreed on proper courses of
action. Politicians’ priorities focus on the wellbeing of the American people, and the military
commits itself to the protection of the United States, but both their paths to achieve these goals
are often different. These disagreements, although common in historical events, highlight the
complicated relationship between military and political leaders during the Vietnam War. These
circumstances are intensified given the lack of a declaration of war during the conflict. The
vague objectives and desultory mobilization formed a problem of cooperation between military
and political officials. Therefore, the two parties frequently disagreed on strategy and foreign
policy.
General William Westmoreland, for example, consistently balanced political, public, and
military success. Westmoreland simultaneously managed the containment of enemy forces, the
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militarization of South Vietnamese forces, and the protection of South Vietnamese citizens.
Westmoreland held numerous responsibilities. Some historians argue Westmoreland simply
failed to comprehend the regional and political context in Vietnam, and simply resorted to a
narrow strategy of attrition. Westmoreland’s strategy focused on attrition and firepower, but with
pressures to spare American lives, maintain a limited war, and restrictions on tactics,
Westmoreland had very little options to pursue victory. Gregory Daddis, a scholar of Vietnam
military history, maintains, “Their [military officials] strategy, while comprehensively planned
and faithfully implemented, was not sufficient in itself for securing victory in Vietnam. It seems
that the one common failing of most military officers and senior civilian officials—among them
MACV's commander—was their faith that military power, broadly defined, could achieve
political objectives in post-colonial states during the Cold War era.”99 Daddis argues that even
talented generals equipped with a comprehensive strategy can still lose a war, as many officers
simply focus their hopes on the effectiveness of military strength. This point, again, reinforces
the idea that countries fighting small wars cannot achieve success without the public, economic,
and political support on the home front. Sheer military strength alone cannot secure a victory.
William Westmoreland agreed, “the big lesson we should learn from Vietnam is that this country
cannot pursue a war unless the American people are in overwhelming support.”100
The Vietnam War lost the overwhelming support of the American people. Many
Americans became convinced that the motivations for war were too vague, making long-standing
support unattainable. Growing military costs and broken political promises of a short war
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solidified American opposition to the Vietnam war. Many Americans failed to understand the
realities of war even as television reports presented the scenes of brutality and carnage to an
unsuspecting public eye. American dissent steadily grew, and politicians now confronted the
management of winning a war without sparking a world conflict, while also appeasing the
public’s concern about casualties and military costs. All of these factors contributed to military
staff’s difficult strategic tasks. Military officials frequently criticized restrictions, media
coverage, and student protests. The strategies to conciliate ultimately resulted in futile tactics and
disillusioned American troops abroad. Politics and military endeavors became too conjoined in
this period of American history, and as a result, efforts in foreign policy suffered.
Conclusion

This thesis focused to on the relationship between the media, general public, and political
restrictions on the changing morale of soldiers. It examines how public reactions can affect
political decision-making, and how the media can create a surge of changing perspectives across
the home front. As politicians, the public, and the media influence one another’s outlooks, the
military is tasked to win a war. In addition, this thesis highlights the complex nature of the
Vietnam War with the division of the American public as well as the military. Historians show
that Americans became divided over the role of the United States in foreign affairs; this thesis
illuminates the split in the military. As antiwar activity continued to escalate on the home front,
many members of the military formed an organized antiwar movement of their own. The
emphasis on the role of democracy as part of post-World War II expectations helps explain the
American failures in the Vietnam War such as the disconnect between the public, politicians, and
the military. This thesis focused on the crucial role of general support to win a war. Public
unpreparedness, vague political motives, and dramatic media coverage ultimately diminished
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support and, therefore, affected the efforts and morale of soldiers in Vietnam. While the
shortcomings of political and public support are important factors to understand the American
loss in Vietnam, this thesis does not extensively examine these military failures. Many scholars
discuss the lack of creativity in General William Westmoreland’s military strategy. This thesis
argues that Westmoreland’s strategy was due to political restrictions and the practice among
democratic nations focusing on expensive firepower. Historians may consider the perspectives of
military personnel across rank and social background. This thesis simply frames members of the
military in a broad category. However, historians may analyze, for example, the pattern between
pro-war generals and anti-war enlisted men. Rank and social background of military officers
versus enlisted soldiers may have played a role in the differences in opinions during the war.

Contemporary literature on the Vietnam War concentrates mainly on the politics of the
conflict. Research on the impact of Presidents Johnson’s and Nixon’s policies, respectively,
highlight the tensions and miscommunication between the public and the military. Broader
themes of America’s role in foreign disputes and fighting for democracy are widely addressed in
the secondary literature. In general, Vietnam War historians frequently question American
intervention, and critique politicians on their broken promises and vague motives. The social and
cultural influences of the failures of Vietnam are integrated into more recent wartime debates.
Scholars and journalists address the role of race and class war as well as the revolutionary role of
American youth in the withdrawal from the war. Contemporary research focuses on the failures
of Vietnam by illuminating growing dissent toward the end of a complex war, and the rise of
American voices for change.
While secondary literature and contemporary coverage on the Vietnam War offer
valuable insights to this discussion, this thesis concentrates on the understudied opinions of
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soldiers in Vietnam. By placing a specific amphasis on the military’s diminishing morale,
broader lessons of the era can be observed such as the role of a democratic society during a
limited war, the disconnect between different parties in the conflict, and a lack of preparation
both mentally and strategically. This thesis discovers a history of wartime support during the
Vietnam War often understood as an era of dissent. Especially during a limited war, the general
public, political leaders, and even the military must be prepared for the realities of war. General
unpreparedness and uneven expectations may inspire the potential for future frustration and
hopelessness. Since the public, politicians, media, and military pursue fundamentally different
objectives and strategies, this thesis can offer greater perspective on future conflicts to mobilize
the efforts of different parties in a more efficient manner.
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